Bearing Witness to the Truth #2

Part I, Indefensible Assertions: Chapter One

In this “doctrinal” part of the report, where the elements of the demonstration are very heterogeneous (undemonstrated general remarks, quotations from texts without perspective, verbatim statements by “victims” or “abusers”, school discussions on Aristotle or Saint Thomas, comparisons of texts, statements and situations of abuse which are intrinsically unrelated, judgments of non- conformity with Church doctrine or Tradition, etc.), it seemed useful to identify the assertions and positions criticized. By formulating precisely what is being called into question, it becomes possible to contrast other texts or assertions that show the fragility of the accusation. When criticizing a philosophical and theological teaching, it is on the basis of the precise formulations it contains that we can reflect and debate – before any hypothesis on the possibility of a deviant use. All the more so since a careful reading of the report leads us to note that none of the “deviances” attributed to Father Marie-Dominique Philippe’s teaching have been established on the basis of the teaching itself, but, for the most part, on the basis of incriminating testimonies about his behavior.

The report’s recurring line of reasoning is that, in view of his alleged actions, Father M.-D. Philippe’s true doctrine lies in everything in his writings and teaching that could be interpreted as a lack of respect for the autonomy of individuals, a conception of God as a modeler and abuser, a vision of the Holy Spirit’s influence that would prohibit reflection, and so on. One searches the texts – no matter how distorted, even to the point of contradiction – for anything that might point in the direction of a search for pleasure in friendship and a Gnostic vision that would encourage an illuminist morality and authorize transgression of the law, lies, all kinds of sexual gestures, etc.

1.     Critical statements in the report and responses

In this report, we have listed over one hundred and fifty assertions which purport to state deviances in Father Philippe’s doctrine, but of which we find no trace in his teaching. These assertions stem from real or supposed misinterpretations that the authors of the report claim to highlight, and whose origin they attribute to Father M.-D. Philippe, rather than from the objectivity of what he wrote or taught. We shall see that they are, for the most part, factually incorrect: quotations cut off, non-existent, taken out of context, misunderstood. So as not to lengthen this reply unnecessarily, we have selected around a hundred, to which we will respond point by point below:

1.  Father Philippe’s teaching is not within the tradition of the Church Fathers, whom he studied very little (p. 515).

Now,

• 1. In De l’être à Dieu, Father Philippe devotes over 200 pages to the study of the Fathers (cf. Topique historique, vol. II, Philosophie et foi, p. 9-237!)¹.

¹ In this work, Father Philippe focuses on Aristides and the Greek Apologists, Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Lactantius, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Athanasius, the Cappadocian Fathers, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, Dydimus the Blind, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, Pseudo-Denysius, Maximus the Confessor, John Damascene, and others. Finally, he pays particular attention to Augustine.

• 2. He returns many times to the different dimensions of the image of God in the Fathers (cf. for example, Les trois sagesses, p. 234, but also Création et recréation). He draws on the parallel between Genesis and the Gospel of John¹  that the Fathers developed extensively.
• 3. He sees Saint Thomas Aquinas as a theological synthesis that assumes the heritage of the Fathers of the Church; indeed, he never ceases to quote them. To work with Saint Thomas is to work with the Fathers. “Among the theologians of the Middle Ages who are deeply rooted in the tradition of the Fathers of the Church, Saint Thomas is certainly the most brilliant and the most aware of the demands of his work as a theologian” (Preface by M.-D. Philippe to Saint Thomas’s Commentary on the Gospel of John, p. 9).
• 4. In Le Mystère de Marie and Le Mystère de Joseph, he draws extensively on the Fathers of the Church ².
• 5. See also, for example, the article: “Les convenances de l’Incarnation selon saint Thomas”, where he begins with a preliminary survey of the position of the Fathers on this subject; “Le mystère de la maternité divine de Marie”, in Maria, t. VI, which cites Hippolytus of Rome, Ignatius of Antioch, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus, Irenaeus, Alexander, Athanasius, etc.; or again, Analyse théologique de la Règle de saint Benoît, attentive to monastic tradition.
• 6. As soon as the theological studies cycle was set up at Rimont (1982-83), patrology courses were given (notably by Father Claude Mondésert, s.j.); and Father M.-D. Philippe had the importance of studying the Fathers of the Church written into the brothers’ Rule of Life.

2.  References to the Magisterium were fragmentary (p. 515).

Now,

• 1. Father Philippe always insisted on unfailing fidelity to the teaching of the Magisterium, especially at a time when the Magisterium was widely contested. By way of example (among many others), see the references to the Magisterium in his work Le mystère de Marie ³ , or in the article “Le mystère de la maternité divine de Marie”, in Maria, t. VI, p.369 ⁴.
• 2. He has always made the brothers attentive to the living Magisterium of the Church. Encyclical letters and papal documents were the subject of specific studies (Laborem exercens, Redemptor hominis, Mulieris dignitatem) or served as a focus for research throughout the year: Novo millenio ineunte, Rosarium virginis Mariae, Fides et ratio, etc. Father Philippe has commented on these Magisterial documents on numerous occasions. See, for example: Redemptor hominis: DT 1979, 6 courses; Laborem exercens: DT 1981-82, 15 courses; Salvifici Doloris: CP 09/03/1984; Redemptoris Mater: CS 6/12/1987; CS 01/05/1988; O5 and O7, 1988: 4 courses; Mulieris dignitatem: O8; Veritatis Splendor: D 11/06/1994; a retreat based on Orientale Lumen: R 1995, 8 courses; the Holy Father’s appeal for the Jubilee of the Year 2000: CS 21/09/1995; Vita consecrata: CS 20/09/1996; a retreat based on Orientale Lumen: R 1995, 8 courses.

(… only a selection of excerpts of these examples are presented in this post…)

5.   Father Philippe downplays the place of Tradition in the sources of Catholic theology (p. 515)

Now,

How can he say this when, between Saint Thomas, the living Magisterium and the Dominican tradition, he is at the heart of Tradition? “In theology, I am a servant of the Church, and so I must take into account the other servants of the Church and all that can be said…”. (Les trois sagesses, p. 226).

(…)

12.      Father Philippe’s conception of Providence leads to a God who models and abuses. God cares nothing for the subject’s spiritual autonomy. (p. 518)

Now,

The report absolutely seeks to show that Father Philippe’s conception of Creation and divine government leads to abuse. On the contrary, Father Philippe categorically rejects pantheism, making explicit both God’s transcendence, and his closeness to us, which drives our human search and actions. He constantly insists that Creation respects and even founds the autonomy of the creature. And he shows how God’s respect for his creature makes him take the “risk” of the possibility of evil and pride (cf. Letter to a Friend, pp. 131-159; and especially pp. 146-152 and 148-149).

13. Too much emphasis on the notion of divine control through the gifts of the Holy Spirit (p. 519).

Now,

The report uses a passage from Joseph’s Mystery as a pretext for the “total and immediate dependence” of Mary on the good pleasure of the Father, to reproach him with a doctrinal imbalance (cf. op. cit., p. 53-54). That the Spirit acted upon the Virgin Mary is directly and properly revealed: “The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you” (Lk 1:35).

On the other hand, this sentence has been taken out of context. This is a text in which Father Philippe shows that God’s presence in our lives does not eliminate our human consistency or our initiatives. Father Philippe thus emphasizes that total dependence on God implies at the same time the greatest freedom. His assertions are exactly in line with those of Saint Thomas, who shows us that the more we insist on dependence on God’s action, the more we see the free initiative of the creature.

14. For Father Philippe, exercising judgment would risk preventing the Holy Spirit from acting. For Father Philippe, the gift of counsel would suppress prudence (p. 519).

• 2. The sentence quoted is taken out of context. From p. 227 to p. 229 (of The Mystery of Christ Crucified and Glorified), Father Philippe dwells successively on acquired prudence, infused prudence and the gift of counsel. He asserts that the Spirit teaches us to exercise them by listening to him beyond our conclusions: “The gift of counsel connaturalizes our practical prudential judgment to the loving demands of the Holy Spirit, thereby regulating all our activities in a new way” (p. 227). He even praises prudence: “Normally, all the works of our active life must be regulated by the acquired virtue of prudence, which in itself is something very great” (p. 227).
• 3. He speaks explicitly of a transformation of our prudential judgment which implies a certain mortification (a classic theme of the Christian life): “The gift of counsel thus mortifies acquired prudence in its exercise; thanks to this gift, we accept that the Holy Spirit takes hold of our prudential judgment and, by transforming it from within, places it entirely at the service of love” (p. 229).

15.    For Father Philippe, “a human act should only be divine, without any human element interfering with it” (p. 520).

Now,

• 1. Father Philippe dwells at length on what determines human acts in philosophy. Following in the footsteps of St. Thomas, he constantly points out that gifts do not suppress the determination of human acts, but rather modify their exercise. On the specificity of gifts, cf. e.g. CP 16/05/1986, TM 28/09/2004, etc.
• 2. The authors of the report don’t seem to fully grasp where Saint Thomas situates the gifts of the Holy Spirit: from the point of view of exercise, of “motion” to use Saint Thomas’s expression. Neither Saint Thomas nor Father Philippe assert that the gifts of the Holy Spirit substitute for what determines our acts (cf. ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 1), but that they have the last word in the order of exercise. (…)

(…)

22.       “An exceptional morality that makes licit acts that common morality reprobates” (p. 527).

This is the doctrinally unsubstantiated suspicion that regularly crops up in the report. Yet there is not a single quotation in Father Philippe’s work to support this view.

23.     Reducing the moral value of an act to its intention (p. 529)

Now,

• 1. From a doctrinal point of view, there is nothing in Father Philippe’s writings that asserts that intention alone gives the voluntary act its goodness or malice. On the contrary, in his analysis of the human act, after studying intention, he went on to deliberation, choice, imperium and voluntary use, showing that intention is not enough. The human act has requirements other than those of intention. There is an abundant literature on this analysis of the complexity of the human act, which cannot be reduced to intention: Polycopié de philosophie de l’activité morale, p. 31-91; Lettre à un ami, p. 38-40; Les trois sagesses, p. 102-104; Retour à la source, I, p. 191-222 ; “Quelques éléments de réflexion pour une philosophie éthique”, in: Aletheia, n° 1-2; Polycopié ULSH 1982-1983, “Is a moral philosophy of the person possible?”, etc. Likewise, numerous lectures on ethical philosophy¹ and a commentary on St Thomas’s treatise on human acts (ST, I-II, q. 6-17): TS 1981, 16 courses.
• 2. In response to a question about the lesser evil, Father Philippe clearly states: “If I’m speaking as a philosopher, I can’t say that, because evil is evil. I would even say that this is a sophism, because you can’t use an evil means to obtain a good. The Holy Father reminds us of this in Veritatis splendor” (Three Wisdoms, p. 317).

29.     Mediocre attention paid to the examination of conscience (p. 538)

Now,

• 1. In L’acte d’offrande, Father Philippe devotes an entire chapter to the examination of conscience, which he presents as an anticipation of our particular judgment (which therefore implies a certain gravity…).
• 2. On several occasions, Father Philippe reminds us that this examination of conscience must take place every day: “You have to understand this every day” (p. 26); “Once you have understood this and are living it, the little examination of conscience every day is truly an anticipation of the particular judgment” (ibid.).
• 3. He often reminded us, as Pope Francis emphasizes, that it is in the light of grace and Christ’s present gaze upon us, therefore in a theological light, that this examination of conscience takes place (cf. FRANÇOIS, Le nom de Dieu est miséricorde, p. 54).

(…)

32.    With love placed above the law, the moral agent would escape the law and the virtues (p. 542).

Now, (…)

• 3. Father Philippe asserts here that love goes further than the law, but that the law takes on its true meaning at the level of the acquisition of virtues (same perspective as Aristotle at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics).
• 4. We should also note Father Philippe’s developed study of education, which includes a real rectification of oneself and we know how much he always talked about a permanent “self-education”. Cf. Au Coeur de l’Amour (At the Heart of Love), chap. 4, pp. 165-290 (on the moral education of concupiscence, cf. pp. 189-193). See also L’éducation (session given in 1978). And, for example, the lectures: AP 01/05/1986; 20/05/1986; 12/05/1987; 10/06/1987, etc.

(…)

39.       For Father Philippe, “the finality being what is essential, reaching this finality would allow the law to be fulfilled, even if it were apparently broken” (p. 548).

Now,

The quotation is cut off, and Father Philippe adds immediately afterwards, to make it clear in what sense this overcoming is to be understood: “To oppose any determination and any formal aspect is to remain with a dialectic of form. We must go beyond that too, and discover the primacy of finality, by discovering a cause, a principle” (Retour à la source, I, p. 325). Father Philippe thus explicitly states that this overcoming does not take place as an “opposition” to form, but in line with “respect” for the law.

40.    “The conclusion of these various passages is clear: according to Father Philippe’s doctrine, the experience of the love of friendship, by making us touch a personal end, authorizes us to go beyond the moral law” (p. 548).

Now,

No quotation has been found in this sense; he says exactly the opposite: love makes it possible to go further than the law, but it must “respect” it.

41.     Father Philippe does not highlight how virtue necessarily contributes to happiness. For him, the virtues play little more than an adjuvant role (p. 551).

Now,

• 1. The report has cut off the text quoted just before, which states that virtue is of the order of structure; it is therefore not an afterthought, but rather something fundamental in us: “Let us think mainly of the great virtues that Aristotle examines at length in the Nicomachean Ethics, the cardinal virtues of strength, temperance, justice and prudence. These virtues structure man and give him his character as a human being. But we cannot confine ourselves to virtue…” (p. 63).
• 2. It is in this light that the text states: “Its role is to enable us to achieve happiness in a more perfect, efficient and delectable way”. Virtue is thus rooted in the subject. By isolating this passage from what comes before, the report asserts that, for Father Philippe, virtue is an afterthought.

(…)

45.     Justice could be ignored or scorned among friends (p. 553)

Now,

The text says the opposite. When Father Philip focuses on the new meaning of justice in friendship, he emphasizes, like Aristotle, that justice is then deeper and implies a greater respect for the other: “Along with the virtue of prudence, we must acquire the moral virtue of justice, which consists in looking at the other with his rights and respecting the rights of the friend. The more we love someone, the more we are his friend, the more we respect his freedom and are concerned to respect everything that belongs to him, what is his duty and what he considers to be a duty for him” (Retour a la Source “Return to the Source”, I, p. 230).

46.     For Father Philippe, “virtue is supposed to bring us back to our own size, to put us in a state of turning in on ourselves, even to put us in a state of anguish” (p. 553).

Now,

• 1. The text quoted in the report does not say that “virtue brings us back to our own size”, nor “puts us in a state of turning in on ourselves”, but: “bringing God’s mercy down to our own size means relying only on our own virtue”. Think of the example of Peter, who wanted to reduce God’s mercy and action to his virtue of strength, by going to the cross relying on himself.
• 2. This text is theological, taking up what St Thomas says about mercy, which, from God’s point of view, “founds” justice, and not the other way round: “The work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy and is founded on it” (ST, I, q. 21, a. 4).

47.      In conclusion, Father Philippe seems to have a quietist tendency. According to him, one must “lose the virtues” and his teaching excessively relativizes human virtues. (p. 553).

Now,

• 1. The conclusion is rather that the report cuts texts and reproaches them for not saying what the report itself has cut; it orients the meaning of the texts.
• 2. It suffices to recall the existence of a few works on the subject of virtues that might be useful: Polycopié de philosophie de l’activité morale “Polycopy of philosophy on moral activity”, p. 121-199 and 228-263; Introduction à la philosophie d’Aristote, “Introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle”, p. 41-67; Philosophie de l’art, “Philosophy of art”, II, p. 25-33; L’être, “Being”, II, 1, p. 231-232; Lettre à ami, “Letter to a friend”, p. 41-43; Retour à la source “Return to the source”, I, p. 224-232 and p. 401-411; “Quelques éléments de réflexion pour une philosophie éthique”, on “l’exigence” des vertus, “A few elements of reflection for an ethical philosophy, on “the demands” of the virtues” pp. 35-37; Poly ULSH 1982-1983, “Une philosophie morale de la personne est-elle possible?” “Is a moral philosophy of the person possible?” 86 pages (about half) on the virtues; Cycle de conférences aux AFC 2000-2001: les vertus cardinales. Justice (7 transcribed lectures); Cycle de conférences aux AFC 2001-2002: les vertus cardinales. La Force et la Tempérance ; Cycle de conférences aux AFC 2002-2003 : Les vertus cardinales. Prudence. Taking these extracts into account, we must be approaching 300 pages devoted exclusively to the virtues…
• 3. The report’s comments on the moral virtues in Father Philippe’s teaching are untenable, not only in the light of his writings, but also in the light of the courses he taught from the 1980s until his death¹. In some cases, the study of virtues was even the theme of the entire academic year, for example in 1993/1994: 15 courses; or in 2003/2004 (on prudence and self-education): 23 courses.

48.     Legitimizing lies (p. 554)

Now,

• 1 “We must defend ourselves against lies, because we cannot make a pact with lies; they destroy love, they destroy fidelity” (Un feu sur la Terre “A Fire on Earth”, p. 220).
• 2. His teaching was no more and no less than that of Saint Thomas: “It is therefore never permissible to tell a lie in order to shield someone from any danger; although it is permissible to prudently conceal the truth, says Saint Augustine” (ST, II-II, q. 110, a. 3, ad 4).
• 3. He often quoted Marthe Robin to show that a truth can be destructive when it is not at the service of the good and love: “Not all truth is good to tell” (cf. Les Trois Sagesses, “The Three Wisdoms”).

49.     “A conception of sin contrary to the Church’s morality” (p. 554)

Now,

• 1. This entire section is entitled: “A conception of sin contrary to the morals of the Church”. However, in this section, the report tries to say that Father Philippe legitimized lying, but nothing is said or quoted about this “conception of sin contrary to the morals of the Church”.
• 2. On the other hand, Father Philippe repeatedly developed the theological question of sin by commenting on Saint Thomas’ treatise throughout the academic year, cf. TS 1981/1982: 12 lectures; TS 1983/1984: 12 lectures; TS 1988/1989: 21 lectures; TS 1993/1994: 13 courses. Also a theology of trials and temptations, cf. e.g. S 1991: 15 courses, TM 1988/89: 21 courses; TM 1989/90: 19 courses, TM 1990/91: 12 courses.

(…)

51.     “Father Philippe reduces the prudence associated with chastity to the political dimension: “because we live in community, we must avoid scandal”; “Prudence now serves only to discern whether the act can be performed without risk of scandal among those who do not yet understand the freedoms that love can take in its bodily expression” (p. 557).

Now,

Father Philippe’s text is cut off in several places, so that what the report quotes from it gives the impression that the meaning is as follows: you can do whatever you like as long as you don’t scandalize (full text in the report’s general appendices, p. 795 ff.).

• 1. On the contrary, the text first specifies that one must be careful with one’s sensibility and that the religious has made a vow of virginity: “Of course, one must be careful not to fall into the trap of not being master of one’s sensibility. Our sensitivity is offered to God…”; “You can never settle things yourself, because you’re a very poor judge! When you’re passionate, the problems arise precisely because of your passion. When you’re passionate, you can’t see clearly, and everything seems normal”; “To pass from the human coarseness of the sinner to the finesse and delicacy of the Father’s child”.

(…)

52.    About friendship, “no limits to be respected in justice” … “he who would set limits can be accused of being unwelcoming” (p. 558)

Now,

Father Philippe says the opposite: “Along with the virtue of prudence, we need to acquire the moral virtue of justice, which consists in looking at the other with his or her rights and respecting the rights of the friend. The more we love someone, the more we are his friend, the more we respect his freedom and are concerned to respect everything that belongs to him” (Retour à la source, “Return to the Source”, I, p. 230). Moreover, Father Philippe stresses all the limits to be set in the exercise of love (cf. ibid., p. 230-232, on strength and temperance).

(…)

54.     “M.-D. Philippe focuses on a single type of friendship, the supreme friendship between friends who give themselves intimately to each other” (p. 560).

Now,

• 1. On the different types of friendship according to the various forms of putting into common, Father Philippe emphasizes that putting into common or sharing has a political dimension, and that friendship thus has a very wide diversity: “This new way of considering the love of friendship will enable Aristotle to specify various types of friendship: paternal friendship, conjugal friendship and fraternal friendship, since these friendships imply various ‘similarities of life’, various ‘sharing’. The Philosopher then draws a very surprising parallel, at first sight, between these various friendships and those that can be established in the city according to the various forms of political government, i.e. royal, aristocratic and democratic forms of government” (Introduction a la philosophie d’Aristote, “Introduction to Aristotle’s Philosophy”, p. 75).
• 2. It is curious that in a report on abuse, this passage, in which Father Philippe is careful to distinguish, following Aristotle, the difference between conjugal love and other friendships, should go unmentioned.
• 3 Father Philippe does not seek to reduce friendship to a single type. He stresses that, in this diversity, what’s important is this putting into common or sharing. He adds that “the more spiritual the friendship, the more deeply this sharing takes hold of us” (De l’amour, p. 75).

(…)

57.     Father Philippe “scarcely addresses the question of friendly relations between unequals… To do so is to condemn oneself to ignoring the mechanisms of domination” (p. 561).

Now,

“Thanks to this analysis, the Philosopher can again distinguish two types of friendship: friendship according to superiority and inferiority, and friendship according to equality, since according to the various human relations of superiority, inferiority or equality, common life is necessarily exercised in various ways and takes on particular modes” (Introduction à la Philosophie d’Aristote, p. 74 “Introduction to Aristotle’s Philosophy”).

58.     The love of friendship is incarnated in the body, assuming eros and passions. This can lead to sexual gestures (p. 566).

Now,

• 1. The rest of the text, omitted by the report, explains the focus of the argument. The diversity of Aristotle’s and Plato’s conceptions of love corresponds to the diversity of these two philosophers’ conceptions of the soul and the body: “These different conceptions of love in Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies are rooted in their very different views of the soul and the body” ((Introduction à la Philosophie d’Aristote, p. 68).
• 2. From this perspective, the text takes on a whole new meaning. Father Philippe compares two philosophical approaches: Plato’s, which tends to separate itself from the sensible, and Aristotle’s, which integrates the place of the body, the passions and thus a certain common life, reciprocity and so on.
• 3. He doesn’t say that friendship assumes erôs as the report understands it: erotic love. It takes “erôs” with reference to Plato’s philosophy, and points out that Aristotle takes up these requirements by “humanizing” them – because in Plato, there is a disincarnated ideal. The text compares érôs and philia, showing how the latter type integrates certain elements of the former in a more human way. In De l’amour (“On Love”), Father Philippe clearly comments on Plato’s erôs love in its dimension of contemplative elevation, which always runs the risk of being a little disembodied, and this is what he takes up here (cf. op. cit., p. 33-56).

59.     M.-D. Philippe considered sexual acts to be legitimate (p. 567)

Now,

The report announces that it will show this point of view in the following (“we’ll see below”). However, in the rest of the report, there is no reference to Father Philippe’s teaching to support this assertion.

(…)

62.     According to Father Philippe, “it seems impossible not to respond to the attraction of a friend by ‘letting yourself be taken by him'” (p. 568).

Now,

• 1. On the contrary, the text says that love goes further “if” the one we love makes us understand that he loves us too, and that friendship “can” then blossom.
• 2. Father Philippe never ceased to teach that we could accept or refuse this first voluntary love: “In the philosophical analysis of the human act based on the experience of the love of friendship, freedom thus appears at two different moments: to accept or refuse the spiritual love of good, and in the choice of means or of the friend” (Retour à la source, I, p. 210, “Return to the Source”). 210) “We are free to accept or not the transformation of this first love into a life intention; and we are free to choose the means that will enable us to come closer to it” (ibid.., p. 211). “It should be emphasized that freedom appears at two different moments: with regard to the spiritual love of the good, to accept or refuse it, and with regard to choice” (“Quelques éléments de réflexions pour une philosophie éthique », p.31 “Some reflections for an ethical philosophy”).

63.     There is no concern about the real freedom of this response (p. 568).

Now,

On the contrary, Father Philippe insists on the difficulties we have in being lucid in order to be fully free: “That’s why love is more difficult to be lucid from the outset (…). (…) This love therefore avoids two extremes: that of despising this conditioning in order to idealize the absolute of the person loved, and that of looking only at the relativity of conditioning, at the current situation of the human person, and loving him or her according to what is immediately visible, to appearances” (De l’amour, p. 181).

(…)

69.      On intention: “The use of expressions like ‘let this love invade us’ and ‘let ourselves be taken by the beloved’ would testify to a fusional vision” (p. 570).

Now,

The passage quoted from Father Philippe (Retour à la source, I, p. 211, “Return to the Source”) has been taken out of context and given a completely different meaning! The report carefully omits a very long text (p. 195-210, which therefore comes before the one quoted by the report, the latter taking on an entirely different meaning when taken out of context). Father Philippe details a whole process of discernment, lucidity and research. And he is careful to emphasize that this discernment is not intuitive but progressive, unlike love at first sight. He explains at length that this transition to intention is achieved through an active search for intelligence and discernment. On the subject of first love, he states: “Its fragility implies, however, that it can be rejected on the basis of the intelligence’s judgment of what it is: is this first spiritual love consistent with the human life I lead now, or not? Can I accept it? Our will can then accept or reject it” (Retour à la source, I, p. 195). “It is the practical intelligence that discerns, not reason” (p. 195). “If the first love is natural, the intention of life is lucid and therefore much more conscious” (p. 195). This passage implies a real “discovery”: “Discovering the end within the good allows us to discover an order in an actual love” (p. 195). “An effort, a new awakening of the intelligence, is therefore necessary to order our lives. People who are purely emotional never arrive at a true intention of life, and become scattered” (p. 196). “Intelligence is necessary to love, and it is intelligence that brings about this rectification, for it is intelligence that, in the service of love, makes it possible to discover intention” (p. 196). We must be attentive to imaginary degradations: “This is what happens, in fact, when the imagination, linked to the passions, takes hold of the first spiritual love: it then loses all its vigour by turning in on itself” (p. 197).

70.     “Do we still speak of friendship when we consider love as something absolute?” (p. 571)

Now,

• 1. The title of the paragraph in the report is: “Passage from first love to the intention of life”, whereas the excerpt quoted is in a part of the book on page 348 (130 pages later!) which has nothing to do with this theme, since it poses the question of the existence of God based on the coexistence in the love of friendship of something absolute and something limited. (…)

(…)

76.     “In Father Marie-Dominique Philippe’s doctrine, mercy is opposed to justice” (p. 576).

Now,

• 1. On the contrary, Father Philippe asserts that when you’re in charge of a community, you can’t always show mercy, because you have to respect the order of the community and the common good: “Mercy has no limits, and you must always show mercy, except when you’re in charge of a group, a community. In that case, you can’t always officially forgive someone whose actions harm the community” (Un feu sur la terre, p. 151, “A fire on the earth”).
• 2. Similarly, in the face of certain injustices, mercy does not exclude the need to defend oneself: “In the face of slander and lies, must we defend ourselves? Yes, we must defend ourselves against lies (…). And in the face of unjust condemnation? Yes, you must defend yourself. If you are unjustly condemned, you must defend yourself” (ibid., p. 220).

On the relationship between justice and mercy, see below, p. 149 ff.

77.     “We have already read M.-D. Philippe’s statement, which sounds the same: ‘Justice is as if resorbed in mercy'” (p. 576).

Now,

The text refers to Saint Augustine’s commentary: “This is the sentence of true justice. A sinner must be punished, but not at the hands of those whose conscience is soiled; the law must be fulfilled, but not by those who themselves trample it underfoot. Yes, it was justice itself that was expressed through the mouth of Jesus; (…) and all that remained was the wretched sinner in the face of merciful goodness” (Homilies on John, XXXIII, 5). Why take this reflection out of context? Why imply that, for Father Philip, mercy is opposed to justice?

78.     “One also becomes inaccessible to any criticism, any call to order, any fraternal correction…” (p. 579)

Now,

Many of our Novitiate lectures focus on fraternal correction. See of course: “This fraternal trust requires the greatest evangelical simplicity and great reciprocal clarity, which allows for mutual correction” (Rule of Life, no. 10).

(…)

80.    “This may have led to Father Philippe’s relative neglect of the moral virtues” (p. 581).

Now,

By dint of asserting and repeating things that have not been established (on the subject of the abandonment of virtues, see the abundant bibliography above), the report gives the impression of an assured doctrine. The report’s self-referentiality is obvious!

(…)

83.      “Once again, Mary seems to have to be deprived (…) Cooperative grace, in which the free will cooperates with God and his grace, would eventually disappear” (p. 585).

Now,

• 1. The report carefully omits the many passages where this book evokes Mary’s free initiatives.
• 2. Some passages on Mary’s initiatives: First “cooperation” of the Christian soul, her consecration (p. 75). “Mary’s first community initiative: the mystery of the Visitation” (p. 123). At Christmas: “She must begin to have maternal initiatives” (p. 144). “The Holy Spirit, after long periods of pure receptivity, can suddenly ask us for certain brand-new initiatives” (p. 144). God expects us to give an effective gift, “where he wants us to have certain initiatives” (p. 144), etc.

(…)

86.     Father M.-D. Philippe would reduce sexuality to the complete sexual act… (p. 589)

Now,

Father Philippe’s doctrinal teaching is unambiguous:

• 1. The affirmation of the clear difference between marriage and religious life, which implies a “radical and total offering of sexuality” in chastity. On the subject of sex education: “It’s so that we can offer it to God, so that he can do what he wants with it: to use it later, if God wants us to marry, or on the contrary to offer it to him radically and totally, if he wants us to consecrate ourselves to him in chastity, in the spirit of virginity” (Au Coeur de l’Amour,p. 263, “At the Heart of Love” ).
• 2. The wrongfulness of sexual practices such as masturbation, and the complicities and self-justifications we may seek to give ourselves because we refuse to see what’s going on. “People say: ‘It’s better to masturbate right away, that’ll stop it.” That’s not true, it doesn’t stop at all: it’s accepting defeat in advance. And accepting defeat in advance doesn’t strengthen a person at all: on the contrary, it weakens him. When you know you’re engaged in a battle, you never have the right to say you’re defeated in advance: that’s turning in on yourself.” (ibid., p. 265). “The natural state, as we know, implies concupiscence; it is not the state of original justice. For the Christian, this is a terrible sophism. (…) We are not at all moving towards a healthy freedom, we are simply letting the passions have their free exercise, and this ends up taking away all strength of struggle, all strength of conquest, and preventing man from forming himself deeply” (ibid., p. 283).
• 3. The expression of a lucidity about the struggle, and the self-delusion in which we are always in danger of finding ourselves in this domain: “If someone affirms that he is perfectly chaste, God allows him to tumble the next day, to show that in this domain, virtues must be acquired” (ibid., p. 266). “Who would dare, on the battlefield, to claim victory? An ‘unforeseen’ temptation can happen right away. The terrain of sexuality is volcanic. Even if we maintain a certain nobility of heart and intelligence in this area, even if we have the impression that the struggles are not as strong, we don’t know that the next day the struggle may be much stronger and more intense and then we will succumb” (ibid., p. 266). “Being a slave to one’s passions means that in reality one does not love the other: one seeks oneself through the other, and there is no true love” (ibid., p. 267).
• 4. The need to call in a psychologist if necessary: “It’s always very complex, and that’s where the advice of a good psychologist can come in, in his or her own field…”. (ibid., p. 272).
• 5. The question of nudity and the need for modesty: “It would be very interesting to recall here what John Paul II said about nudity, in his teaching on the passages from Genesis. The Holy Father recalled that the state of innocence implied the possibility of nudity. (…) We are no longer in that state of innocence. We bear the consequences of original sin. There is therefore in us a propensity towards the sensible and especially towards the sexual: the concupiscence of the flesh; and love is not strong enough to assume this sexuality” (ibid., p. 281). “It’s a question of truth, not sincerity, as some people claim. They say it’s more sincere to be naked, because the garment hides. But it doesn’t hide in the sense of creating a lie: it veils to enable something truer and nobler. This is the profound meaning of clothing: to veil in order to allow virtue to develop and our gaze not to fix itself uselessly on that which could stop it and be the cause of evil excitement” (p. 282).

(…)

89.     “Father Philippe dissociated spiritual love linked to sensitivity from the sexual act, which was the result of an “instinct of nature”. “This concept of a love that is both spiritual and sensitive, but goes beyond sexuality, seems to apply to the relationship between Mary and Joseph” (p. 594).

Now,

• 1. Father Philippe says of Mary and Joseph: “The whole aspect of sexuality is completely surpassed”. But he “doesn’t specify”, simply because Revelation says nothing on the subject. Father Philippe cannot be reproached for not imaginatively embroidering on the content of Revelation.
• 2. On the other hand, Revelation tells us that Mary and Joseph were human beings; if we take this to its logical conclusion, we must therefore affirm, as St Thomas did with regard to virginity, that they had certainly not fallen into the vice of insensitivity (cf. ST, II-II, q. 152, a. 2, ad 2).
• 3. So when Father Philippe is asked: “Was there a certain tenderness between Mary and Joseph?”, he replies: “Yes, of course, and even a very great tenderness, since no creature was as sensitive and affectionate as Mary, in a very great clarity and purity. The friendship was there; and the bond between Mary and Joseph remains a very great secret, which we don’t penetrate so easily… What seems very clear to me is that spiritual human love is always linked to the sensitive; it is therefore linked to passion, since the affective sensibility is passion; this affective sensibility is distinct from the erotic, sexual aspect. There are links, but the two must be distinguished. So it’s easy to understand how the love of Mary and Joseph, who have such clarity, could be affectionate, very tender, very loving, while at the same time fully respecting each other’s chastity, for love of Christ and for love of each other’s consecration to God. It’s not at all a cold, platonic love, such as exists among people who are not virtuous and who are afraid to love, afraid of what is sensitive” (Au cœur de l’amour, p. 42-43, “At the Heart of Love).
• 4. Father Philippe thus distinguishes tenderness and sexuality, not by opposing them, but by emphasizing that tenderness has a deeper extension and intensity than sexuality taken by itself.
• 5. This is what Pope Francis develops in Amoris laetitia, distinguishing between a tenderness that assumes sexuality and a non-sexualized tenderness. In one: “It shares everything in constant mutual respect. The Second Vatican Council echoed this by stating that “such a love, bringing together the human and the divine, leads the partners to a free and mutual self-giving, experienced in tenderness and action, and permeating their entire lives” (op. cit., no. 125). In the other: “Tenderness, on the other hand, is a sign of a love free of selfish possessiveness. It makes us approach a person with immense respect and a certain dread of causing them harm or taking away their freedom. Loving another person involves the joy of contemplating and appreciating their innate beauty and sacredness, which is greater than my needs” (ibid., no. 127).

90.     Father Philippe does not insist on obedience to the bishops (p. 597).

Now,

• 1. In the founding of the Communauté Saint-Jean, Father Philippe notes the place of the bishops and not just the Pope: “If I do something, I want to do it in complete dependence on the Church. They [the first brothers] were in complete agreement with this” (Les trois sagesses, p. 359, “The three wisdoms”). Father Philippe goes on to explain what he means by this: “This is how the alliance with Lérins came about, after four bishops had given their opinion, since Rome wanted everything to be done according to canonical rules. In fact, four bishops – Cardinal Renard, Mgr Barthe (then bishop of Fréjus-Toulon), Mgr Lebourgeois (then bishop of Autun), and the bishop of Sion (in Valais) – gave their opinion and said they agreed. Rome then quickly granted the community its first official recognition” (ibid., pp. 360-361).
• 2. In the Rule of Life: “… fully respecting its apostolic purpose, with the constant concern to remain at the service of the Church in obedience to the bishops and to the Supreme Pontiff, whom they will regard as their highest superior” (Rule of Life, no. 8).
• 3. During Father Philippe’s lifetime, a priory was only founded at the express request of a local bishop, with a call to a particular mission in his diocese. In Father Philippe’s teaching, the place of bishops (and not only of the Pope) is unambiguous, both in the founding of the community, in its Rule of Life, and in the various missions received and exercised throughout the world.
• 4. On the importance of the Church hierarchy, see for example: CP 06/14/2000; 06/28/2000; 12/13/2000 (on the authority of the Church).

(…)

94.     “The priest or spiritual father mediates God’s influence” (p. 604).

Now,

The report does not quote a single line of Father Philippe’s teaching on the role of the spiritual father. Yet, on many occasions, he develops what the “authority” characteristic of a spiritual father is … precisely by asserting that it is not a question of “authority” in the strict sense of the term, but rather of a witness and a person who attests or confirms a passage of God in the life of another person, but without imposing anything that would come from him. We are surprised by this omission, given the abundance of Father Philippe’s teaching on this subject: cf. CP 23/101979 and 27/05/1980;  23/01/1985  (priestly  paternity);  27/10/1989;  09/11/1989;  14/12/1989; 22/12/1989; CPN 25/05/1983; 28/11/1984; 05/12/1984; 07/05/1998, etc.

• 1. Let’s look at an extract from this teaching: “The further we go, the more we need confirmation of the Holy Spirit’s guidance over us. Obviously, not every day! Once a year, twice a year, for important decisions, the great intentions of life. When we’re just starting out, we need to be enlightened more often, but not otherwise. An instrument of God is there to confirm the great turning points, the great moments, and at that moment we must have the simplicity to say: “Here’s what’s happening. Is this in line with the Holy Spirit? This is what, it seems to me, the Holy Spirit is asking of me”. The director must not impose his spirituality; it’s the one being directed, the child of God, who expresses himself and asks. That’s very important; if he doesn’t ask, we keep quiet” (Conference, 25. 05. 1988).
• 2. The spiritual father’s role is much more self-effacing than that of an educator: “The educator takes initiatives, but the spiritual director does not: he is the instrument of the Holy Spirit, so he listens and tries to understand, tries to discern what is of the Holy Spirit and what is of our own invention. The proper role of spiritual direction and spiritual paternity is to exercise discernment; we are there to distinguish between what can be imaginative and what is of the Holy Spirit” (ibid.). (…)

(…)

97.    Approaches religious life as an abstract and ambiguous quest for perfection. The “perfection of the beatitudes” would be reserved for religious alone (p. 607).

Now,

• 1. Father Philippe teaches a very classic vision, abundantly developed by St. Thomas: the perfection of the Christian life lies in charity (which is a direct result of grace), and it is towards this that the religious tends: “It is charity that unites us to God, the ultimate end of the human soul. Indeed: “He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him” (1 Jn 4:16). The perfection of the Christian life is therefore taken especially in relation to charity” (ST, II-II, q. 184, a. 1). Saint Thomas explicitly adds that what is required of the religious is not that he be perfect, but that he tend towards this perfection: “Religion designates a state of perfection because of the end pursued. Therefore, it is not required that every religious be already perfect. What is required is that he tend towards perfection” (ST, II-II, q. 186, a. 1, ad 3).
• 2. A classic vision, revived since Vita consecrata. Religious life must manifest the wonder of grace in our human frailty: “The first duty of the consecrated life is to make visible the marvels wrought by God in the frail humanity of those who are called. They bear witness to these marvels not so much in words as by the eloquent language of a transfigured life, capable of amazing the world. To people’s astonishment they respond by proclaiming the wonders of grace accomplished by the Lord in those whom he loves. To the degree that consecrated persons let themselves be guided by the Spirit to the heights of perfection they can exclaim: “I see the beauty of your grace, I contemplate its radiance, I reflect its light; I am caught up in its ineffable splendour; I am taken outside myself as I think of myself'” (Vita consecrata, no. 20).
• 3. Obviously, the fact that in the passage quoted (in his oral style) Father Philippe affirms that religious life tends in itself not towards the perfection of the virtues, but of the beatitudes, does not mean that religious life is opposed to the virtues. (…)

99.     “Religious life in the Saint John Family has suffered from an excessive focus on ‘friendship love’ to the detriment of notions central to religious life such as fraternity” (p. 608).

Now,

In the Rule of Life, the word “friendship” is non-existent. On the other hand, it speaks abundantly of “communion with the brothers”. In the Formation Charter, friendship appears not as the foundation of the community, but as what needs to be “purified”.

100.       “Friendship was an absolute personal right. It could not be renounced, except perhaps if there was a clear risk of scandal” (p. 608).

Now,

Factually, where does one find such a line in Father Philippe’s teaching on religious life? The report presents this assertion as a supposed conclusion, but gives no reference. The Brothers’ Rule of Life says exactly the opposite about poverty, stating precisely that it entails not having a right to anything, but receiving everything as a free gift (cf. no. 14).

As for the Formation Charter, it affirms that, in religious life, bonds of friendship must be “purified”: “We must learn to overcome, through our fraternal bonds, the false affective sincerity that prevents us from living in true fidelity to those whom the Lord asks us to love. (…) Instead of living the true love of Christ through the gift he gives us of our brothers and sisters, we run the risk of trying to monopolize them by reducing love to the joy we derive from their presence for us” (Formation Charter, “Obstacles to the love of friendship and the incarnation of fraternal charity”). Further on, the same text denounces exclusivity in friendship, inviting us to look to the mystery of Christ and Mary as the foundation of fraternal charity (ibid., Conclusion).

101.        “If God, through the gift of wisdom, makes us see everything in His light, what room is left for journeying with a superior?” (p. 609).

Now,

Why does the report introduce opposition where none exists? As if our immediate connection to God were an obstacle to our religious consecration? Saint Thomas soundly reminds us that, as far as the inner movement of our will is concerned, we are bound to obey God alone. We are bound to obey men only from the point of view of external acts and the body, and not in an absolute way (he specifies that it is at this level that religious obedience of external forum is situated).

• 1. We are bound to obey God alone: “As regards the interior movement of the will, we are not bound to obey men, but God alone” (ST, II-II, q. 104, a. 5).
• 2. Obedience to a human superior looks at the disposition of our human acts (through the body): “One is bound to obey men in the external acts of the body. However, even here, according to the nature of the body, we are not bound to obey men, but only God, because all men are naturally equal, for example with regard to food and generation. So servants are not obliged to obey their masters, nor children their parents, to contract marriage or to keep virginity, etc. But as regards the organization of his activity and human affairs, the subject is bound to obey his superior, taking into account his own superiority; thus the soldier to the head of the army as regards war; the servant to his master as regards the service to be performed; the son to his father as regards the conduct of his life and domestic organization, and so on” (ibid.).
• 3. In this article, it is objected that what has just been said does not apply to religious, who must obey their superior in everything: “The religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in everything. In the same way, he is bound to obey in everything” (ibid., arg. 3). He replies that this obedience is not total, but only with regard to the rule: “Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful.” (ibid., ad 3).

2.     Conclusions

Line by line, we see more clearly the futility of looking for intellectual wanderings or biased teachings in Father Philippe and we see, on the contrary, the extraordinary richness, coherence and solidity of his “doctrine” rooted in the history of philosophy and the theological Tradition of the Church. But we also see the ease of misinterpretations on the part of certain brothers and sisters called to give their testimony, of theologians who already have a ready-made doctrine applied to Father Philippe’s thought and, above all, on the part of the contributors to the report. We must therefore try to understand this distortion, as well as its relationship to the teaching given and the context in which it was given. The reception of intellectual research depends not only on its content and the personality of the person imparting it, but also on the dispositions of each listener and the context in which this communication takes place.

An impossible thesis to support

A careful reading of the report’s criticisms of Father Philippe’s teaching clearly shows that Father Philippe’s alleged doctrinal “deviances” are not inferred from his teaching, but postulated from testimonies against him. If we pay close attention to the texts, there’s not a single passage about a modeling God, no pantheistic tendencies, not a single line about incitement to transgress the law or legitimization of lying, etc. But, on the contrary, many texts go in the opposite direction.

Admittedly, the report’s editors could have said that they don’t actually rely on the texts to establish these “deviances”, but postulate a diffuse teaching—which the editors attempt to do in some places by quoting various letters, sayings and interpretations. However, the report overwhelmingly presents its argument from Father Philippe’s writings, and claims to show us these “deviances” in the texts. It should therefore have respected the texts themselves.

In most cases, the texts are so forced that one wonders what the reasons are for such a lack of intellectual integrity. Suspicion transformed into vindictive panic? One example among many: Father Philippe asserts that knowledge of practical first principles awakens for us in a human environment: “It seems that knowledge of practical first principles is acquired in the traditional environment, within which the child imitates what his elders see done” (quoted in the report, p. 535). The report comments on this text by stating peremptorily that Father Philippe makes “the first practical principles depend on the environment alone” (p. 536). Now, to say that knowledge of first principles is acquired “in” an environment is not to say that they “depend on the environment alone”. This kind of shift in the meaning of the texts is revealing, and testifies to a lack of knowledge of the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas, on which the report claims to be based. According to Saint Thomas, knowledge of practical first principles requires sensations and memory; this knowledge is therefore acquired in a certain environment. This does not mean, however, that the practical truths discovered in this environment are relative to it alone.

Another example: on the subject of conscience,^[1] Father Philippe makes the nuanced statement that “This consciousness (cette conscience; ie this awareness) will, moreover, have different degrees of intensity, from the very clear consciousness (la conscience très claire) of certain intuitions to a more opaque consciousness (une conscience plus opaque,), more difficult to discern, of certain practical judgments”. The report concludes: for Father Philippe, moral conscience (or consciousness) “is here characterized by its opacity” (p. 537). (The report interprets: “This consciousness (cette conscience) of certain practical judgments, which seems to encompass moral conscience”). No, the text doesn’t reduce moral conscience to opacity, it speaks of “certain practical judgments”.

Or again, in connection with a text by Father Philippe which seeks to draw the consequences of anopposition that one could make between law and finality: “Law, when it opposes a personal end…”; conclusion of the report: “The opposition between finality and law is clear in the following text…”. (p. 547). No! Father Philippe is talking about a perversion of the law: “The law, when it opposes…” and the report concludes that Father Philippe opposes the two.

In some cases, the report simply overrides the meaning of the text, making it say the opposite. For example, the report tries at all costs to show that Father Philippe makes no distinction between common life and putting in common/sharing, which differs from one friendship to another. The report insists on showing that, for Father Philippe, friendship always implies an extreme common life without any discernment. “He readily interprets koïnônia [putting in common] as meaning the common life required to a certain extent by friendship” (p. 560). Yet Father Philippe’s text expressly states the opposite: “Koinonia [putting in common] considered in itself is not the actual exercise of the love of friendship, but rather its foundation”. Father Philippe quite rightly distinguishes between various friendships according to their foundation. An uninformed reader is unlikely to see these misunderstandings, which requires returning to the text beyond the apparently serious and scholarly presentation made in the report.

In certain passages, the report seems to be on the lookout for words to trap Father Philippe’s teaching: “Control of the Spirit”, “érôs“, ” sensible pleasure”, “tenderness”, “animality”, etc. The very word is enough to show deviance, regardless of its meaning in the sentence and its context, even if Father Philippe quotes a philosopher whose thought he does not follow (for example, on the subject of erôs by Plato). The report seems more like a “hunt” than an analysis.

We can’t go into all the truncated or misread quotations here – we’ve listed over a hundred and fifty… By dint of asserting and repeating things that have not been established, the report gives the impression of an assured doctrine. Those unfamiliar with Father Philippe’s texts cannot imagine that the report’s redactors would have truncated and forced such a considerable number of texts. The report thus plays on quantity. Yet it is not by multiplying false assertions that we arrive at a truth. It’s one thing to criticize Father Philippe for alleged deviations in his behavior; it’s quite another to criticize him for having theorized or conceptualized these deviations in a doctrine. Yet, in the doctrinal section of the report, nothing is demonstrated about this doctrine; rather, the opposite is observed. This observation—if only because of the astonishment it arouses—legitimizes questions. Normally, when we conduct a survey and ask a question, we consider that several answers are possible. The possibility of another reading is not even raised, because the answer has already been decided on the basis of the intimate convictions of the report’s authors.

Ultimately, this “doctrinal section” discredits the entire report. This part, which should be the most objective, shows on the contrary,  the decisive importance of bias. Already in the other parts of the report, the reader is supposed to trust the various testimonials quoted, without being able to assess their value for himself, since most of the testimonials are anonymous. The advantage of an objective doctrinal section would be to allow the reader to go to the sources himself. However, it has to be said that the report represents a real obstacle, insofar as it does not respect the texts, but almost systematically cuts and truncates them. If this is true of texts that we can verify, what about testimonials, which are by definition more difficult to verify?

The vast majority of people reading this doctrinal section of the report will spontaneously trust it – the report’s authors are doctors of theology, and present themselves as having a good knowledge of Father Philippe’s texts. The majority of readers will obviously not read Father Philippe’s work in its entirety to verify what is being said. By force of circumstance, and given the context, this doctrinal section thus comes to replace the work of the man it criticizes on the points raised (and they are very numerous and touch on all dimensions of his research).

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^[1] (note of translator): In the French language, the one word “conscience” could mean a faculty of moral judgment, as well as state of perception (consciousness, awareness).